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Protect	  This	  House?	  Transnational	  Party	  Group	  Influence	  on	  	  
Candidate	  Selection	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament	  
	  
	   The	  benefits	  of	  legislator	  seniority	  are	  well	  established	  in	  the	  scholarly	  literature	  
on	  legislative	  politics.	  Developed	  initially	  within	  the	  American	  congressional	  context	  (eg.,	  
Davis	  1990;	  Holcombe	  1989;	  Weingast	  and	  Marshall	  1988),	  the	  worth	  of	  long-­‐serving	  
legislators—viz.,	  their	  ability	  to	  function	  productively	  and	  provide	  tangible	  policy	  and	  
office	  benefits	  to	  their	  political	  parties	  and	  constituents—has	  also	  been	  explored	  by	  
scholars	  of	  comparative	  politics	  (Jones	  et	  al.	  2002;	  McKelvey	  and	  Riezman	  1992;	  Shomer	  
2009).	  Much	  of	  this	  literature	  has	  also	  been	  concerned	  with	  the	  increasing	  
‘personalization’	  that	  comes	  with	  legislator	  seniority:	  legislators	  feel	  more	  independent,	  
having	  developed	  an	  individual	  brand	  during	  their	  tenure,	  and	  begin	  to	  behave	  in	  ways	  
that	  appear	  less	  beholden	  to	  their	  respective	  political	  parties	  and	  more	  directly	  linked	  to	  
voters.	  While	  such	  scenarios	  typically	  model	  legislators	  as	  the	  agents	  of	  either	  political	  
party	  or	  constituent	  principals,	  what	  happens	  when	  the	  agents	  are	  unable	  to	  identify	  
who	  the	  most	  important	  principals	  are?	  	  
	   The	  European	  Parliament	  (EP)	  offers	  a	  particularly	  challenging	  context	  for	  the	  
study	  of	  legislator	  seniority	  benefits.	  Although	  recent	  work	  has	  shown	  that,	  as	  in	  most	  
other	  legislatures,	  members	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  (MEPs)	  benefit	  directly	  from	  
their	  seniority	  by	  being	  selected	  for	  valuable	  internal	  positions,	  such	  as	  EP	  
rapporteurships	  (i.e.,	  Daniel	  2013),	  the	  transnational	  party	  groups	  that	  organize	  these	  
internal	  offices	  and	  allocate	  the	  committee	  reports	  needed	  to	  exercise	  individual	  
legislative	  power	  are	  not	  the	  same	  as	  the	  national	  political	  parties	  that	  nominate	  MEPs	  
for	  election.	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To	  further	  complicate	  matters,	  scholars	  of	  the	  EP	  have	  consistently	  found	  that	  
there	  is	  a	  surprisingly	  weak	  link	  between	  MEPs	  and	  their	  national	  political	  parties,	  
beyond	  pressuring	  their	  party	  members	  during	  of	  a	  handful	  of	  key	  EP	  votes	  and	  lobbying	  
for	  the	  acquisition	  of	  desirable	  committee	  assignments	  (Ladrech	  2007;	  Mair	  2000;	  Rose	  
and	  Borz	  2013).	  Moreover,	  the	  second-­‐order	  election	  theory	  that	  dominates	  the	  
literature	  on	  EP	  elections	  (i.e.,	  Reif	  and	  Schmitt	  1980)	  suggests	  that	  voters	  are	  mostly	  
disinterested	  with	  or	  unaware	  of	  their	  MEPs’	  legislative	  behavior.	  Therefore,	  if	  the	  
traditional	  legislative	  principals—constituents	  and	  the	  national	  political	  parties	  that	  they	  
vote	  for—are	  disconnected	  from	  the	  work	  of	  their	  MEP	  agents,	  and	  the	  transnational	  
party	  groups	  are	  invested	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  work	  of	  their	  MEPs,	  but	  do	  not	  have	  an	  
ability	  to	  directly	  control	  their	  electoral	  fortunes,	  then	  who	  are	  the	  real	  legislative	  
principals	  in	  the	  EP?	  Furthermore,	  what	  benefit	  do	  professionally	  ambitious	  MEPs	  have	  
to	  curry	  favor	  with	  transnational	  party	  groups	  that	  dominate	  the	  internal	  political	  
processes	  of	  the	  EP,	  while	  incurring	  the	  risk	  that	  their	  national	  parties	  will	  not	  
acknowledge	  their	  contributions	  and	  may	  simply	  decide	  to	  replace	  them	  at	  election	  
time?	  	  
Accordingly,	  this	  paper	  explores	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  MEPs	  that	  are	  the	  most	  
valuable	  to	  the	  EP	  transnational	  party	  groups—those	  that	  hold	  key	  internal	  positions,	  
exert	  a	  disproportionate	  amount	  of	  legislative	  influence,	  and	  benefit	  from	  additional	  
perks	  of	  legislative	  seniority—are	  also	  protected	  at	  election	  time	  by	  the	  national	  parties	  
that	  responsible	  for	  selecting	  them.	  In	  so	  doing,	  it	  asks	  if	  the	  benefits	  accrued	  by	  senior,	  
important	  MEPs	  are	  acknowledged	  and	  rewarded	  by	  their	  national	  political	  principals	  in	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the	  form	  of	  a	  ‘safe’	  position	  on	  the	  ballot.	  Should	  this	  be	  the	  case,	  the	  potential	  
confusion	  created	  by	  the	  ‘double	  principal’	  problem	  experienced	  by	  MEPs	  may	  not	  be	  of	  
major	  practical	  concern.	  However,	  should	  national	  parties	  choose	  not	  to	  protect	  	  the	  
EP’s	  most	  important	  legislators,	  then	  the	  work	  that	  they	  accomplish	  may	  have	  been	  in	  
vain.	  	  
In	  the	  following	  section,	  I	  review	  important	  developments	  in	  the	  relationship	  
between	  national	  political	  parties	  and	  their	  EP	  analogues.	  After	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  
literature	  has	  remained	  mostly	  pessimistic	  about	  the	  awareness	  of	  national	  parties	  to	  
the	  EP’s	  internal	  debates	  and	  organizational	  structures,	  I	  develop	  a	  set	  of	  testable	  
hypotheses	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  indicate	  whether	  or	  not	  national	  parties	  are	  indeed	  
influenced	  by	  an	  MEP’s	  internal	  stature	  in	  the	  drafting	  of	  EP	  election	  ballots.	  I	  test	  these	  
assertions	  using	  original	  data	  on	  the	  personal	  backgrounds	  and	  careers	  of	  all	  MEPs	  from	  
the	  most	  recently	  completed	  session	  of	  the	  EP,	  2009-­‐2014.	  By	  using	  a	  novel	  selection	  
model	  to	  account	  for	  MEPs	  that	  did	  not	  stand	  for	  reelection,	  I	  am	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  
that	  senior	  MEPs	  holding	  positions	  of	  influence	  within	  the	  EP	  committee	  system	  are	  
routinely	  retained	  by	  their	  national	  parties	  in	  ‘safe’	  spots	  on	  EP	  election	  ballots.	  This	  
may	  suggest	  that	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  dueling	  national	  and	  transnational	  party	  
principals	  and	  their	  MEP	  agents	  is	  stronger	  than	  initially	  thought.	  
1.	  EP	  party	  groups	  and	  the	  national	  political	  parties	  
	   Although	  MEPs	  have	  worked	  in	  ideologically	  similar	  transnational	  party	  groups	  
(TPGs)	  since	  the	  first	  direct	  elections	  to	  the	  EP	  in	  1979,	  scholars	  of	  political	  science	  have	  
traditionally	  assumed	  that	  TPGs	  have	  had	  a	  fairly	  limited	  impact	  on	  the	  functioning	  and	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content	  of	  Europe’s	  national	  political	  parties.	  Mair	  (2000)	  discusses	  the	  little	  ‘spillover’	  
that	  had	  occurred	  from	  the	  TPGs	  to	  the	  national	  parties,	  in	  terms	  of	  change	  to	  party	  
organization	  or	  programs,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  fourth	  EP	  session	  in	  1999.	  He	  finds	  this	  lack	  
of	  impact	  on	  the	  national	  parties	  to	  be	  troubling,	  particularly	  as	  the	  increased	  power	  of	  
the	  EP	  since	  the	  advent	  of	  co-­‐decision	  should	  mean	  that	  MEPs	  are	  often	  responsible	  for	  
drafting	  and	  amending	  legislation,	  long	  before	  it	  reaches	  national	  legislator	  colleague.	  
Three	  sessions	  of	  the	  EP	  later,	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  between	  TPGs	  and	  national	  parties	  
seems	  relatively	  unchanged.	  
The	  Changing	  Importance	  of	  Transnational	  Party	  Groups	  
	   The	  pan-­‐European	  movement,	  following	  World	  War	  Two,	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  
so-­‐called	  party	  ‘federations’	  across	  the	  continent	  –	  with	  transnational	  organizations	  
sprouting	  up	  from	  within	  each	  of	  the	  major	  ideological	  paradigms	  of	  democratic	  Europe:	  
socialists,	  conservatives,	  Christian	  democrats,	  liberals,	  and	  even	  newer	  ecological	  
movements	  all	  rushed	  to	  develop	  networks	  to	  coordinate	  the	  work	  of	  national	  political	  
parties	  across	  national	  borders.	  Hix	  and	  Lord	  (1997)	  and	  Raunio	  (1997)	  explore	  this	  
development	  from	  within	  the	  EP,	  concurring	  with	  earlier	  work	  from	  Reif	  and	  
Niedermayer	  (1987)	  that,	  although	  the	  party	  federations	  each	  offer	  a	  different	  level	  of	  
institutionalization	  and	  professionalization,	  their	  most	  powerful	  offshoots	  could	  be	  
found	  in	  the	  TPGs	  organizing	  the	  work	  of	  MEPs	  in	  Strasbourg	  and	  Brussels.	  Kreppel's	  
(2002)	  authoritative	  tome	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  EP	  firmly	  established	  the	  
importance	  of	  the	  TPGs	  for	  EU	  politics—definitively	  showing	  that	  European	  legislators	  
chose	  mostly	  to	  work	  along	  ideological,	  as	  opposed	  to	  national,	  lines.	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   Nonetheless,	  for	  as	  much	  as	  the	  TPGs	  have	  been	  a	  central	  focus	  of	  internal	  
politics	  at	  the	  EP,	  there	  is	  less	  conclusive	  accord	  that	  they	  have	  effected	  any	  real	  change	  
in	  the	  functioning	  of	  national	  political	  parties.	  Various	  scholars	  have	  examined	  changes	  
within	  specific	  ideological	  currents	  and	  national	  arenas	  (eg.,	  Bomberg	  2002;	  Dietz	  2000;	  
Kirchner	  1988;	  Ladrech	  1993;	  Poguntke	  2007),	  but	  most	  have	  maintained	  the	  pessimistic	  
tone	  taken	  by	  Mair	  (2000)—TPGs	  may	  be	  important	  the	  EP’s	  internal	  organization,	  but	  
they	  are	  of	  little	  relevance	  to	  the	  national	  party	  systems	  of	  Europe.	  	  
	   One	  exception	  to	  this	  literature	  is	  the	  work	  of	  Poguntke	  et	  al.	  (2007),	  who	  
contend	  that	  the	  forces	  of	  European	  integration	  have	  changed	  the	  standard	  operating	  
procedures	  of	  political	  parties,	  at	  least	  from	  an	  organizational	  perspective.	  According	  to	  
their	  work,	  national	  parties	  have	  become	  increasingly	  centralized	  around	  party	  
executives,	  as	  the	  EU	  integration	  process	  continues	  to	  be	  mostly	  driven	  by	  national	  
elites.	  Moreover,	  national	  political	  parties	  have	  been	  forced	  to	  recruit	  and	  identify	  so-­‐
called	  EU	  ‘specialists’	  to	  seek	  election	  to	  the	  EP—politicians	  with	  the	  legal	  skills,	  
technical	  knowledge,	  and	  personal	  ambition	  to	  work	  at	  the	  European,	  instead	  of	  the	  
national,	  level.	  While	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  would	  seem	  to	  indicate	  that	  national	  parties	  
ought	  to	  become	  less	  invested	  in	  the	  work	  of	  their	  MEPs—handing	  over	  the	  reins	  to	  the	  
TPG	  leadership	  and	  not	  obstructing	  the	  careers	  of	  their	  MEPs—this	  was	  clearly	  not	  the	  
case	  for	  all	  MEPs	  with	  the	  ambition	  to	  seek	  reelection	  to	  the	  EP	  in	  2014.	  	  
The	  ‘Double	  Principal’	  Problem:	  Is	  the	  National	  or	  the	  Transnational	  party	  in	  control?	  
	   The	  fact	  remains	  that	  the	  present	  relationship	  between	  the	  TPGs	  and	  the	  
national	  political	  parties	  is	  problematic	  for	  both	  organizational	  and	  political	  reasons.	  
Protect	  This	  House?	   7	  
Politicians	  wishing	  to	  develop	  a	  career	  within	  the	  EP	  are	  pressured	  to	  craft	  policy	  and	  
cast	  votes	  that	  benefit	  the	  ideological	  programs	  of	  the	  TPGs,	  yet	  it	  is	  the	  national	  parties	  
that	  ultimately	  decide	  their	  fate	  at	  election	  time.	  For	  this	  reason,	  EP	  scholars	  have	  
become	  increasingly	  concerned	  with	  determining	  just	  who	  is	  running	  the	  show	  in	  
Strasbourg	  and	  Brussels:	  is	  it	  the	  TPGs	  or	  the	  national	  parties?	  
	   The	  bulk	  of	  this	  literature	  has	  examined	  the	  impact	  of	  both	  the	  TPGs,	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  national	  parties,	  on	  MEP	  voting	  behavior.	  For	  example,	  Lindberg	  (2008)	  finds	  that	  
MEPs	  who	  were	  loyal	  to	  their	  TPGs	  and	  reflected	  their	  group’s	  mean	  ideological	  
preferences—in	  terms	  of	  voting	  behavior—were	  the	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  favored	  in	  the	  
allocation	  of	  politically	  valuable	  committee	  rapporteurships,	  although	  such	  MEPs	  also	  
often	  voted	  in	  line	  with	  national	  party	  preferences.	  Somewhat	  differently,	  Yordanova	  
(2009)	  finds	  that	  TPGs	  are	  ultimately	  responsible	  for	  directing	  EP	  committee	  
assignments,	  although	  national	  parties	  also	  revealed	  strong	  preferences	  for	  particularly	  
powerful	  committee	  assignments.	  	  
	   In	  terms	  of	  the	  benefits	  (or	  costs)	  of	  placing	  ones	  loyalty	  correctly,	  Faas	  (2003)	  
makes	  a	  highly	  compelling	  institutional	  argument.	  MEPs	  hailing	  from	  national	  parties	  
with	  centralized	  candidate	  selection	  procedure,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  from	  proportional	  
representation	  election	  systems—where	  name	  recognition	  is	  less	  valuable	  for	  election—
were	  shown	  to	  be	  the	  most	  likely	  to	  vote	  against	  TPG	  preferences,	  when	  those	  
preferences	  conflicted	  with	  their	  national	  political	  party	  programs.	  Similarly,	  MEPs	  from	  
national	  parties	  currently	  serving	  in	  national	  governments	  were	  also	  less	  likely	  to	  remain	  
loyal	  to	  their	  TPG,	  above	  the	  wishes	  of	  national	  parties.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  article	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suggests	  that	  MEPs	  with	  less	  ability	  to	  personalize	  their	  reelection	  campaign	  and	  more	  
interest	  in	  pleasing	  national	  party	  bosses	  will	  be	  less	  invested	  in	  the	  work	  of	  their	  TPGs.	  	  
	   More	  recently,	  similar	  results	  were	  obtained	  by	  Rasmussen	  (2008),	  using	  survey	  
data	  from	  2004-­‐2009	  MEPs.	  MEPs	  were	  shown	  to	  have	  links	  with	  both	  TPGs	  and	  their	  
national	  parties:	  legislators	  reported	  feeling	  an	  “attitudinal	  link”	  with	  their	  national	  
parties,	  agreeing	  with	  them	  on	  most	  policy	  areas,	  but	  a	  “regulatory	  link”	  to	  their	  TPGs,	  
who	  control	  their	  advancement	  within	  the	  EP.	  In	  essence,	  this	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  the	  
initial	  query	  of	  the	  paper.	  MEPs,	  as	  political	  agents,	  are	  essentially	  trapped	  in	  a	  double	  
principal	  problem—navigating	  between	  decisions	  that	  they	  feel	  will	  please	  their	  national	  
or	  their	  transnational	  party	  groups	  at	  different	  times.	  Meanwhile,	  both	  principals	  
control	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  their	  MEP	  agents’	  work;	  yet,	  neither	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  
work	  very	  closely	  with	  the	  other	  and	  each	  retains	  sovereignty	  over	  different	  portions	  of	  
the	  EP’s	  electoral-­‐legislative	  processes.	  Who,	  then,	  should	  an	  ambitious	  MEP	  with	  
career	  aspirations	  firmly	  in	  the	  EP	  decide	  to	  listen	  to?	  
2.	  Hypotheses	  and	  Research	  Design	  
	   While	  electoral	  laws	  vary	  by	  EU	  member	  state,	  each	  country	  is	  responsible	  for	  
electing	  their	  EP	  delegation	  via	  some	  degree	  of	  proportional	  representation	  (as	  opposed	  
to	  a	  single	  member	  district	  or	  ‘first-­‐past-­‐the-­‐post’	  system).	  National	  parties	  are	  
responsible	  for	  drafting	  their	  electoral	  lists,	  as	  well	  as	  recruiting	  and	  selecting	  their	  
candidates	  for	  election	  to	  the	  EP.	  In	  most	  cases,	  these	  lists	  reveal	  a	  degree	  of	  preference	  
on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  party:	  candidates	  appearing	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  list	  are	  likely	  ‘safer’	  bets	  
for	  election	  than	  those	  at	  the	  bottom.	  Therefore,	  if	  national	  parties	  are	  indeed	  aware	  of	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the	  relative	  importance	  of	  their	  incumbent	  MEPs,	  then	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  see	  the	  
most	  valuable	  MEPs	  appearing	  in	  the	  safest	  list	  positions.	  	  
	   A	  host	  of	  individual-­‐level	  variables	  may	  suggest	  which	  MEPs	  are	  the	  most	  likely	  
to	  be	  viewed	  as	  valuable	  to	  the	  TPGs	  and/or	  the	  national	  parties.	  As	  discussed	  by	  Daniel	  
(2013),	  senior	  MEPs	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  selected	  to	  serve	  as	  committee	  rapporteurs—
an	  important	  internal	  position	  that	  offers	  both	  policy	  and	  office	  benefits	  to	  their	  TPGs,	  
as	  they	  are	  responsible	  for	  drafting	  the	  EP’s	  position	  on	  a	  given	  legislative	  topic.	  
Accordingly,	  I	  expect	  that	  if	  the	  national	  parties	  are	  aware	  of	  MEP	  importance,	  then	  
MEPs	  that	  have	  served	  longer	  in	  the	  EP	  will	  be	  offered	  a	  more	  secure	  spot	  on	  the	  
election	  list	  (H1).	  Similarly	  MEPs	  that	  have	  been	  more	  frequently	  selected	  by	  their	  TPGs	  
to	  serve	  as	  rapporteur	  will	  also	  be	  offered	  more	  secure	  spots	  on	  electoral	  lists	  (H2).	  
	   MEPs	  have	  additional	  positions	  of	  influence	  that	  they	  can	  acquire	  within	  the	  EP.	  	  
The	  EP’s	  internal	  organization	  contains	  an	  indirectly	  elected	  president,	  a	  council	  of	  vice	  
presidents,	  legislative	  quaestors	  responsible	  for	  the	  Parliament’s	  internal	  functioning,	  
and	  a	  bureau	  of	  party	  group	  leaders.	  Taking	  cues	  from	  a	  similar	  line	  of	  thought	  discussed	  
above,	  I	  expect	  that	  MEPs	  holding	  an	  internal	  office	  will	  also	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  
selected	  for	  a	  secure	  electoral	  position	  (H3).	  Within	  the	  EP’s	  important	  legislative	  
committee	  system,	  the	  committees	  are	  directed	  by	  chairs,	  vice	  chairs,	  and	  party	  group	  
coordinators.	  I	  similarly	  anticipate	  that	  these	  committee	  leaders	  will	  also	  receive	  safer	  
spots	  on	  the	  electoral	  lists,	  as	  they	  are	  more	  directly	  responsible	  to	  providing	  policy	  
benefits	  to	  their	  parties	  and	  TPGs	  (H4).	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   Individual	  demographics	  may	  also	  come	  into	  play.	  The	  trend	  towards	  
encouraging	  the	  recruitment	  of	  female	  candidates	  operates	  similarly	  within	  the	  EP	  to	  
other	  progressive	  democracies	  in	  Europe.	  Thus,	  female	  MEPs	  seeking	  reelection	  may	  
benefit	  from	  their	  gender	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  list	  position	  (H5).	  In	  keeping	  with	  Daniel	  
(2013)	  and	  Poguntke	  et	  al.	  (2007),	  the	  technical	  nature	  of	  EP	  legislation	  oftentimes	  
requires	  MEPs	  to	  be	  policy	  experts	  in	  a	  way	  that	  exceeds	  the	  talents	  of	  the	  traditional	  
broker	  class	  of	  politicians.	  Therefore,	  MEPs	  with	  more	  advanced	  educations	  may	  also	  be	  
more	  likely	  to	  be	  retained	  by	  their	  national	  parties	  in	  safe	  list	  spots	  (H6).	  All	  TPGs	  are	  
not	  created	  equally,	  so	  an	  MEP’s	  party	  group	  may	  also	  affect	  their	  reelection	  prospects.	  
MEPs	  from	  national	  parties	  currently	  in	  government	  may	  also	  benefit	  (or	  suffer)	  from	  
their	  party’s	  currently	  heightened	  national	  status.	  	  
Accounting	  for	  the	  selection	  effect	  
	   While	  my	  research	  question	  focuses	  on	  the	  determinants	  of	  candidate	  list	  
position	  in	  EP	  elections,	  this	  assumes	  that	  MEPs	  have	  the	  personal	  ambition	  to	  seek	  
reelection	  the	  EP	  at	  all.	  While	  the	  majority	  of	  outgoing	  MEPs	  do	  seek	  reelection,	  many	  
others	  choose	  to	  seek	  national	  office,	  a	  different	  career	  path	  within	  the	  EU,	  or	  simply	  to	  
retire	  from	  public	  life	  at	  the	  end	  of	  their	  mandate	  (see	  Daniel	  2015).	  Therefore,	  any	  
model	  meant	  to	  predict	  an	  MEP’s	  likelihood	  of	  reelection,	  based	  upon	  their	  list	  position,	  
must	  first	  consider	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  MEP	  in	  question	  desired	  to	  seek	  reelection	  at	  all.	  	  
	   In	  keeping	  with	  the	  theories	  discussed	  by	  Daniel	  (2015),	  I	  consider	  likely	  
determinates	  of	  reelection-­‐seeking.	  The	  most	  productive	  and	  central	  figures	  of	  the	  EP	  
will	  likely	  seek	  reelection,	  for	  example,	  as	  they	  have	  clearly	  committed	  themselves	  to	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the	  spirit	  of	  the	  EP’s	  work.	  MEPs	  from	  federal	  and	  decentralized	  countries	  have	  also	  
been	  shown	  to	  seek	  reelection	  in	  higher	  rates,	  as	  their	  political	  parties	  are	  more	  
accustomed	  to	  selecting	  candidates	  across	  multiple	  levels	  of	  representation.	  By	  contrast,	  
MEPs	  that	  dropped	  out	  before	  the	  completion	  of	  their	  mandate	  will	  likely	  not	  seek	  
reelection.	  Older	  MEPs,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  from	  countries	  that	  are	  geographically	  distant	  
from	  Brussels,	  may	  also	  have	  less	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  seek	  reelection	  and	  maintain	  the	  
grueling	  work	  schedule	  of	  an	  MEP.	  Each	  of	  these	  possibilities	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  by	  
the	  empirical	  model.	  	  
Data	  and	  Variables	  
	   To	  estimate	  the	  likelihood	  of	  an	  MEP’s	  selection	  into	  a	  secure	  spot	  for	  reelection,	  
given	  their	  desire	  to	  do	  so,	  I	  use	  original	  biographical	  data	  for	  all	  MEPs	  that	  served	  
during	  the	  most	  recent	  2009-­‐2014	  term.	  The	  data	  was	  initially	  collected	  for	  use	  by	  
Daniel	  (2015),	  but	  has	  been	  further	  refined	  for	  this	  project,	  with	  additional	  variables	  
related	  to	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  paper	  included.	  Data	  was	  collected	  from	  publicly	  available	  
sources—predominantly	  the	  European	  Parliament	  website1	  and	  Burson-­‐Marsteller’s	  
Europe	  Decides	  database	  of	  official	  2014	  EP	  election	  lists.2	  Many	  coding	  decisions	  were	  
then	  cross-­‐referenced	  with	  a	  similar	  dataset	  used	  by	  Thomme,	  Ringe,	  and	  Victor	  (2015).	  
	   As	  the	  question	  of	  candidate	  list	  placement	  relies	  upon	  an	  MEP	  deciding	  to	  seek	  
reelection,	  I	  use	  a	  two-­‐stage	  selection	  specification,	  similar	  to	  what	  has	  been	  advocated	  
by	  Heckman	  (1979).	  The	  first	  stage	  operates	  as	  a	  probit	  regression,	  with	  the	  dependent	  
variable	  measuring	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  MEP	  sought	  reelection	  at	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Available	  at:	  http://www.europarl.europa.eu	  	  2	  Available	  at:	  http://europedecides.eu/european-­‐parliament/#tab-­‐candidate-­‐lists	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2009-­‐2014	  term.	  Descriptive	  statistics	  for	  the	  variables	  described	  below	  are	  found	  in	  
Table	  1.	  
[Table	  1	  about	  here.]	  
The	  decision	  to	  seek	  reelection	  to	  the	  EP	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  a	  number	  of	  
factors:	  the	  number	  of	  terms	  served,	  their	  age,	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  were	  an	  early	  
dropout	  from	  the	  session,	  their	  gender,	  whether	  or	  not	  their	  national	  party	  was	  in	  
government	  in	  their	  home	  country,	  committee	  and	  EP	  leadership,	  how	  often	  they	  were	  
selected	  to	  write	  rapporteurships,	  the	  presence	  of	  local	  elections	  in	  their	  home	  country	  
(a	  common	  measure	  of	  federalism,	  used	  by	  Teorell	  et	  al.	  2011),	  and	  the	  distance	  of	  the	  
MEP’s	  national	  capital	  to	  Brussels,	  in	  miles.	  While	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  not	  to	  
discuss	  the	  determinants	  of	  MEP	  ambition,	  the	  results	  of	  this	  dichotomous	  estimation	  
are	  displayed	  in	  Table	  2.	  All	  told,	  508	  or	  848	  MEPs	  that	  served	  during	  the	  2009-­‐2014	  
period	  stood	  for	  reelection	  in	  May	  2014.	  
	   Following	  the	  dichotomous	  estimation	  of	  an	  MEP’s	  decision	  to	  seek	  reelection,	  a	  
second	  equation	  estimated	  a	  given	  MEP’s	  security	  on	  national	  election	  lists.	  Using	  data	  
collected	  from	  the	  official	  2014	  election	  lists	  of	  all	  member	  states,	  I	  created	  the	  variable	  
MEP	  list	  rank,	  which	  serves	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable	  for	  the	  outcome	  equation.	  The	  
variable	  is	  trichotomous,	  where	  the	  maximum	  value	  of	  2	  corresponds	  to	  an	  MEP	  who	  is	  
featured	  in	  the	  most	  optimal	  list	  spot.	  In	  a	  fully	  closed	  and	  national	  list,	  this	  would	  be	  an	  
MEP	  featured	  in	  the	  first	  position	  on	  the	  list.	  For	  MEPs	  from	  countries	  such	  as	  France	  or	  
the	  UK,	  where	  lists	  are	  divided	  by	  region,	  the	  coding	  also	  includes	  MEPs	  in	  the	  prime	  
position	  for	  their	  region.	  For	  MEPs	  from	  countries	  where	  the	  list	  is	  ranked	  by	  the	  party,	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by	  voters	  may	  indicate	  a	  preference,	  the	  same	  remains	  true.	  This	  is	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  
work	  of	  Marcinkiewicz	  (2014),	  who	  shows	  that	  Polish	  voters	  routinely	  preference	  top-­‐
listed	  candidates,	  even	  when	  they	  can	  change	  the	  order.3	  
	   MEPs	  who	  do	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  prime	  list	  position,	  but	  do	  appear	  in	  a	  relatively	  
safe	  spot,	  are	  coded	  with	  a	  1.	  In	  order	  to	  ascertain	  which	  spots	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  safe,	  I	  
consider	  the	  size	  of	  national	  party	  delegations	  in	  the	  outgoing	  2009-­‐2014	  EP.	  If,	  for	  
example,	  a	  given	  country	  has	  five	  MEPs	  from	  the	  EPP	  party	  group	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  term,	  
I	  consider	  the	  first	  five	  spots	  on	  the	  2014	  EPP	  list	  to	  be	  relatively	  safe	  in	  the	  next	  term.	  
For	  countries	  with	  regional	  lists,	  I	  divide	  the	  number	  of	  seats	  held	  by	  the	  party	  group	  
across	  by	  region.	  Also	  similar	  to	  the	  logic	  discussed	  above,	  I	  rely	  upon	  this	  metric	  for	  lists	  
that	  allow	  voters	  to	  re-­‐order	  candidate	  position,	  but	  which	  do	  offer	  an	  order	  suggested	  
by	  parties.	  One	  additional	  caveat	  can	  be	  added	  to	  this	  category:	  for	  purely	  open	  lists,	  
where	  all	  candidates	  are	  unordered	  and	  voters	  are	  not	  constrained	  by	  party	  lists,	  all	  
incumbent	  MEPs	  have	  a	  theoretically	  equal	  position	  on	  the	  ballot	  and	  all	  receive	  a	  value	  
of	  1.	  
	   Finally,	  MEPs	  who	  fall	  outside	  of	  prime	  or	  relatively	  safe	  positions	  are	  coded	  with	  
a	  0.	  Oftentimes,	  these	  are	  MEPs	  that	  desire	  to	  be	  reelected,	  but	  who	  are	  purposefully	  
demoted	  by	  their	  national	  political	  parties.	  In	  some	  cases,	  MEPs	  were	  not	  selected	  by	  
their	  national	  party	  for	  reelection,	  or	  left	  their	  national	  party	  during	  the	  2009-­‐2014	  term,	  
and	  went	  on	  to	  form	  their	  own	  list.	  As	  these	  newly	  created	  lists	  were	  not	  previously	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  One	  exception	  to	  this	  rule	  is	  Polish	  candidates	  that	  are	  placed	  in	  the	  last	  list	  spot,	  which	  is	  similarly	  visible	  and	  oftentimes	  offered	  as	  a	  preference	  by	  voters.	  For	  MEPs	  appearing	  in	  the	  list	  spot	  on	  the	  list,	  they	  were	  also	  coded	  with	  2.	  
Protect	  This	  House?	   14	  
elected,	  even	  incumbents	  at	  the	  head	  of	  these	  lists—such	  as	  Dutch	  MEP	  Laurence	  
Stassen,	  who	  left	  the	  Dutch	  Freedom	  Party	  and	  to	  run	  for	  election	  in	  2014	  on	  a	  newly	  
created	  party	  list	  in	  the	  UK—are	  given	  a	  value	  of	  0.	  In	  keeping	  with	  the	  discussion	  from	  
the	  start	  of	  the	  paper,	  if	  many	  MEPs	  that	  have	  demonstrated	  their	  internal	  value	  to	  the	  
EP	  appear	  in	  such	  undesirable	  positions	  for	  election,	  then	  national	  parties	  and	  TPGs	  may	  
be	  more	  separate	  in	  their	  preferences	  than	  previously	  thought.	  	  
	   As	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  trichotomous,	  I	  estimate	  the	  second-­‐stage	  outcome	  
model	  using	  an	  ordered	  probit	  specification,	  which	  accounts	  for	  multiple	  discrete	  values	  
of	  an	  ordered	  nature.	  Luca,	  Giuseppe,	  and	  Perotti	  (2010)	  develop	  a	  statistical	  technique	  
for	  this	  process,	  in	  which	  observations	  that	  select	  into	  the	  outcome	  equation,	  via	  the	  
first-­‐stage	  dichotomous	  probit	  estimate,	  can	  then	  be	  estimated	  using	  ordered	  probit.	  
This	  process	  differs	  from	  a	  traditional	  Heckman	  model,	  which	  estimates	  the	  second-­‐
stage	  equation	  using	  Ordinary	  Least	  Squares	  (OLS).	  However,	  as	  the	  list	  rank	  variable	  
does	  contain	  ordered	  and	  discrete	  potential	  outcomes,	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  
dependent	  variable	  of	  interest	  is	  not	  normal	  and	  OLS	  is	  inappropriate	  for	  use.	  	  
	   As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  hypothesis	  section	  above,	  if	  the	  national	  parties	  are	  aware	  
of	  which	  of	  their	  MEPs	  are	  the	  most	  valuable	  to	  them	  in	  the	  EP	  legislative	  process,	  then	  I	  
expect	  that	  MEPs	  having	  served	  more	  terms	  in	  the	  EP	  will	  receive	  a	  better	  list	  placement	  
in	  the	  election—in	  other	  words,	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  
MEPs	  having	  written	  the	  most	  rapporteurships	  during	  the	  2009-­‐2014	  term,	  those	  having	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served	  in	  positions	  of	  internal	  leadership,	  female	  MEPs,	  and	  more	  educated	  MEPs4	  will	  
all	  also	  receive	  a	  better	  list	  placement	  and	  have	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  the	  outcome	  
dependent	  variable.	  In	  keeping	  with	  the	  expectations	  of	  Faas	  (2003)	  and	  others,	  an	  
MEP’s	  TPG	  and	  the	  status	  of	  their	  national	  party	  in	  national	  government	  may	  also	  have	  
an	  impact	  on	  their	  list	  placement.	  These	  possibilities	  are	  all	  considered	  in	  the	  results	  of	  
the	  regression	  analysis,	  found	  in	  Table	  2.	  
[Table	  2	  about	  here.]	  
3.	  Results	  and	  Analysis	  
	   Regression	  coefficients	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  MEP	  individual	  and	  group	  
characteristics	  on	  the	  decision	  to	  seek	  reelection	  and	  be	  well	  placed	  on	  an	  electoral	  list	  
are	  displayed	  in	  Table	  2.	  Model	  1	  displays	  the	  outcome	  equation—what	  determines	  an	  
MEP’s	  list	  rank	  on	  the	  party	  electoral	  list—given	  that	  the	  MEP	  in	  question	  selected	  into	  
this	  equation	  by	  seeking	  reelection	  in	  the	  probit	  equation	  displayed	  in	  Model	  2.	  The	  
Wald	  Test	  results	  displayed	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  table	  indicate	  that	  the	  two	  equations	  
are	  highly	  negatively	  correlated,	  meaning	  that	  the	  outcome	  equation	  is	  highly	  affected	  
by	  the	  selection	  equation	  and	  the	  two-­‐stage	  specification	  is	  therefore	  warranted.	  	  
	   Both	  models	  provide	  interesting	  insights	  into	  the	  behavior	  of	  MEPs	  and	  their	  
relationships	  with	  TPGs	  and	  national	  political	  parties.	  In	  Model	  2,	  MEPs	  that	  served	  
multiple	  terms	  were	  actually	  less	  likely	  to	  seek	  reelection,	  though	  this	  is	  likely	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  education	  variable	  is	  a	  four-­‐point	  ordinal	  scale,	  coded	  for	  an	  MEP’s	  highest	  attained	  degree.	  MEPs	  with	  a	  postgraduate	  degree	  were	  coded	  with	  4,	  MEPs	  with	  bachelors	  degrees	  received	  a	  3,	  some	  university	  courses	  or	  a	  preparatory	  secondary	  school	  education	  received	  a	  2,	  and	  MEPs	  with	  only	  a	  vocation	  or	  elementary	  education	  received	  a	  1.	  For	  additional	  information	  on	  this	  coding	  scheme,	  please	  refer	  to	  Daniel	  (2015;	  2013).	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reflection	  of	  the	  most	  senior	  MEPs	  choosing	  to	  retire	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  term.	  In	  a	  similar	  
vein,	  dropout	  MEPs	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  seek	  election	  for	  a	  future	  term.	  Logically,	  MEPs	  
from	  countries	  located	  the	  farthest	  away	  from	  Brussels	  were	  the	  least	  likely	  to	  seek	  
reelection.	  This	  is	  also	  a	  reasonable	  finding;	  a	  flight	  from	  Cyprus	  to	  Brussels,	  for	  example,	  
takes	  about	  as	  to	  complete	  as	  one	  between	  New	  York	  and	  Los	  Angeles—quite	  a	  long	  
journey	  for	  legislators	  whose	  jobs	  have	  them	  shuffling	  between	  Brussels	  and	  Strasbourg,	  
already.	  	  
	   Model	  1	  provides	  insight	  on	  the	  connection	  between	  MEP	  value	  to	  TPGs	  and	  
national	  party	  reselection	  for	  a	  future	  term.	  Here,	  many	  of	  the	  variables	  behave	  in	  the	  
expected	  directions.	  MEPs	  having	  served	  multiple	  terms	  are	  positively	  associated	  with	  
list	  rank,	  meaning	  that	  veteran	  MEPs	  do	  receive	  privileged	  spots	  on	  national	  election	  
lists	  and	  offering	  support	  for	  H1.	  Frequent	  rapporteurs	  and	  EP	  internal	  leaders,	  however,	  
do	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  likelihood	  of	  being	  well	  positioned	  for	  reelection.	  This	  does	  not	  
support	  H2	  and	  H3	  and	  suggests	  that	  these	  highly	  important	  internal	  offices	  may	  
actually	  be	  ignored	  by	  the	  national	  parties	  of	  MEPs.	  Interestingly	  enough,	  MEPs	  serving	  
in	  committee	  leadership	  roles	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  nominated	  to	  favorable	  list	  positions	  
and	  more	  highly	  educated	  MEPs	  are	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  lead	  national	  lists.	  This	  finding	  
supports	  H4	  and	  H6	  and	  suggests	  that	  an	  MEP’s	  value	  may	  be	  understood	  different	  
outside	  of	  the	  legislature.	  Finally,	  female	  MEPs	  were	  not	  shown	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  
advantage,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  list	  positioning.	  	  
	   Because	  the	  substantive	  interpretation	  of	  an	  ordered	  probit	  model	  is	  not	  directly	  
evident	  from	  the	  coefficients	  displayed	  in	  Table	  2,	  I	  analyze	  the	  substantive	  effect	  of	  the	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statistically	  significant	  variables	  of	  interest	  in	  Model	  1	  using	  marginal	  effects.	  MEP	  
seniority	  and	  committee	  leadership	  are	  among	  the	  most	  substantively	  meaningful.	  For	  
each	  additional	  term	  served,	  an	  MEP	  is	  5.64%	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  placed	  at	  the	  head	  of	  a	  
national	  list;	  committee	  leaders	  are	  shown	  to	  be	  about	  9.61%	  more	  likely	  to	  occupy	  the	  
top	  spot	  on	  a	  national	  list.	  Education	  also	  has	  a	  positive	  impact,	  with	  each	  additional	  
level	  increasing	  an	  MEP’s	  likelihood	  of	  being	  the	  list	  leader	  by	  2.9%.	  	  
	   The	  flipside	  can	  also	  be	  analyzed	  and	  marginal	  effects	  were	  also	  computed	  for	  
those	  MEPs	  placed	  in	  the	  least	  secure	  electoral	  positions.	  Each	  additional	  term	  served	  
made	  an	  MEP	  2.8%	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  placed	  in	  electoral	  peril	  by	  their	  national	  party	  and	  
committee	  leaders	  were	  4.39%	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  given	  a	  poor	  position;	  MEP	  education	  
had	  a	  smaller	  effect,	  at	  a	  decrease	  of	  1.45%	  likelihood	  of	  being	  placed	  in	  an	  unsafe	  
position	  with	  each	  additional	  degree	  earned.	  Marginal	  effects	  were	  also	  calculated	  for	  
the	  possible	  outcome	  of	  ‘1’,	  where	  an	  MEP	  is	  placed	  in	  a	  safe	  position,	  but	  not	  at	  the	  top	  
of	  the	  list.	  In	  those	  cases,	  the	  substantive	  significance	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  ‘0’	  outcome,	  
where	  seniority	  and	  committee	  leadership	  both	  reducing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  being	  placed	  
further	  down	  the	  list.	  	  
	   One	  final	  result	  that	  deserves	  some	  attention	  are	  the	  control	  variables	  for	  party	  
in	  national	  government	  and	  party	  groups.	  Each	  of	  the	  traditional	  TPGs	  were	  controlled	  
for	  in	  the	  outcome	  model:	  EPP	  (Christian	  democrats),	  S&D	  (socialists),	  ALDE	  (liberals),	  
and	  ECR	  (national	  conservatives).	  MEPs	  from	  both	  of	  the	  largest	  party	  groups—EPP	  and	  
S&D—were	  less	  likely	  to	  secure	  a	  top	  spot	  on	  the	  list.	  Part	  of	  this	  is	  likely	  just	  a	  
reflection	  of	  the	  larger	  size	  of	  these	  party	  groups,	  as	  there	  are	  only	  a	  finite	  number	  of	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prime	  spots	  on	  the	  list.	  However,	  it	  may	  also	  have	  something	  to	  do	  with	  MEPs	  whose	  
national	  party	  is	  in	  government	  back	  at	  home.	  	  
MEPs	  whose	  national	  party	  is	  in	  government	  at	  election	  time	  were	  4.15%	  more	  
likely	  to	  occupy	  an	  unsafe	  spot	  on	  the	  reelection	  list	  and	  8.39%	  less	  likely	  to	  occupy	  a	  
top	  position.	  Why	  might	  this	  be	  the	  case?	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  such	  MEPs	  option	  for	  an	  
unsafe	  spot	  on	  purpose,	  desiring	  to	  enter	  into	  national	  government	  and	  running	  for	  the	  
EP	  with	  no	  intention	  to	  take	  their	  seat.	  Another	  possibility	  is	  that,	  with	  their	  national	  
party	  in	  government,	  MEPs	  may	  find	  themselves	  crowded	  out	  by	  an	  influx	  of	  would-­‐be	  
politicians,	  securing	  plum	  spots	  on	  EP	  lists	  as	  a	  reward	  for	  loyalty	  at	  home.	  The	  outcome	  
is	  interesting	  and	  worthy	  of	  additional	  speculation	  and	  study.	  	  
Model	  Limitations	  
	   While	  the	  selection	  model	  does	  an	  ample	  job	  of	  providing	  statistically	  and	  
substantively	  meaningful	  results,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  potential	  drawbacks	  to	  this	  
model	  specification.	  The	  most	  likely	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  omitted	  variable	  bias.	  Data	  was	  
collected	  for	  a	  number	  of	  other	  explanatory	  and	  control	  variables.	  MEP	  national	  
delegation	  heads,	  for	  example,	  might	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  well	  placed	  by	  national	  
parties,	  as	  they	  are	  also	  the	  closest	  of	  their	  country’s	  MEPs	  to	  the	  national	  party	  
organization.	  Data	  on	  this	  variable	  was	  only	  partially	  obtained	  by	  the	  time	  of	  this	  paper’s	  	  
current	  draft.	  The	  data	  considers	  only	  the	  seventh	  wave	  of	  the	  EP,	  2009-­‐2014,	  but	  an	  
interesting	  addition	  to	  the	  story	  may	  be	  to	  expand	  the	  models	  to	  additional	  waves.	  
However,	  this	  will	  likely	  prove	  difficult,	  as	  well-­‐organized	  electoral	  lists	  are	  not	  easily	  
available	  for	  all	  waves	  of	  the	  EP.	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   One	  additional	  variable	  that	  could	  be	  collected	  for	  a	  future	  version	  of	  the	  paper	  
might	  examine	  an	  MEP’s	  ideological	  extremity,	  compared	  to	  either	  their	  national	  
delegation	  or	  to	  their	  TPG	  on	  the	  whole.	  The	  premise	  here	  might	  be	  that	  extreme	  MEPs	  
are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  well	  positioned	  for	  reelection,	  particularly	  if	  their	  views	  are	  out	  of	  
sync	  with	  their	  national	  political	  party.	  I	  have	  previously	  used	  Hix’s	  NOMINATE	  data	  on	  
earlier	  waves	  of	  the	  EP	  to	  show	  that	  extreme	  MEPs	  are	  actually	  not	  that	  likely	  to	  be	  
discriminated	  against,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  report	  allocation,	  but	  similar	  measures	  for	  the	  
2009-­‐2014	  period	  should	  be	  collected	  and	  analyzed	  against	  MEP	  list	  rank.	  
	   Additional	  controls	  were	  collected,	  but	  could	  not	  be	  included,	  due	  to	  the	  
sensitive	  nature	  of	  two-­‐stage	  selection	  models.	  These	  include	  country	  fixed	  effects,	  
controls	  for	  delegation	  size,	  and	  controls	  for	  list	  type	  (open,	  ordered,	  blocked,	  etc.).	  
National	  level	  data,	  such	  as	  public	  opinion	  on	  the	  EP	  and	  public	  opinion	  on	  the	  EU,	  may	  
also	  play	  an	  interesting	  role	  on	  the	  management	  of	  MEPs.	  In	  each	  case,	  the	  data	  is	  
available,	  but	  a	  theoretically	  driven	  decision	  to	  omit	  these	  controls	  was	  taken,	  due	  to	  
the	  statistical	  constraints	  of	  the	  model.	  	  
	   Finally,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  while	  both	  known	  and	  unknown	  variables	  
were	  omitted	  from	  the	  model,	  the	  selection	  model	  is	  still	  a	  vast	  improvement	  over	  a	  
split	  sample,	  in	  which	  only	  MEPs	  who	  sought	  reelection	  are	  considered.	  A	  censored	  
version	  of	  the	  ordered	  probit,	  accounting	  only	  for	  list	  rank	  and	  excluding	  MEPs	  that	  did	  
not	  seek	  reelection	  was	  estimated	  and	  proved	  to	  be	  highly	  inefficient.	  This	  further	  
confirms	  the	  rho	  statistic	  from	  Table	  2,	  which	  was	  used	  to	  determine	  that	  the	  two-­‐stage	  
process	  was	  an	  improvement	  over	  the	  separate	  estimation	  of	  the	  two	  models.	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4.	  	  Discussion	  and	  Conclusion	  	  
	   The	  preceding	  section	  revealed	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  new	  information	  about	  the	  nature	  
of	  MEP	  worth	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  national	  political	  parties	  to	  control	  the	  electoral	  
fortunes	  of	  their	  MEPs.	  While	  some	  aspects	  of	  an	  MEP’s	  value	  to	  their	  TPG	  in	  the	  EP	  
seem	  not	  to	  be	  an	  influence	  on	  national	  political	  parties—such	  as	  EP	  leadership	  
positions	  and	  rapporteurships—others—like	  committee	  leadership	  positions	  and	  
seniority—are	  rewarded	  by	  national	  political	  parties.	  What,	  then,	  does	  this	  mean	  for	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  TPGs,	  the	  national	  political	  parties,	  and	  MEPs.	  	  
	   The	  scholarly	  literature,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  popular	  press,	  would	  have	  us	  believe	  that	  
the	  job	  of	  MEP	  is	  underappreciated	  by	  voters	  and	  oftentimes	  misunderstood	  by	  their	  
parties.	  Nonetheless,	  certain	  aspects	  of	  an	  MEP’s	  work	  do	  seem	  to	  be	  recognized	  and	  
rewarded	  by	  their	  national	  parties.	  For	  MEPs	  that	  are	  able	  to	  commit	  to	  a	  lengthy	  period	  
of	  work	  in	  the	  EP,	  it	  appears	  that	  national	  parties	  are	  likely	  to	  work	  with	  them	  to	  keep	  
them	  in	  office.	  This	  is	  encouraging	  news	  for	  scholars	  and	  practitioners	  who	  show	  
concern	  that	  political	  parties	  may	  actually	  work	  against	  their	  best	  interests,	  by	  removing	  
veteran	  MEPs	  from	  office.	  Furthermore,	  some	  internal	  positions—such	  as	  committee	  
leadership—do	  appear	  to	  help	  an	  MEP	  become	  more	  visible	  to	  their	  national	  political	  
party.	  This	  somewhat	  echoes	  the	  findings	  of	  Yordanova	  (2009)	  and	  Whitaker	  (2009).	  
	   Nevertheless,	  other	  aspects	  of	  MEP	  work	  seem	  to	  be	  less	  important	  to	  political	  
parties.	  While	  Daniel	  (2013)	  shows	  that	  MEPs	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  serve	  as	  important	  
legislative	  rapporteurs	  when	  they	  posses	  some	  degree	  of	  seniority,	  the	  number	  of	  
rapporteurships	  written	  by	  an	  MEP	  does	  not	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  their	  reelection	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prospects.	  Similarly,	  internally	  important	  positions,	  such	  as	  members	  of	  the	  EP	  Bureau	  
or	  College	  of	  Quaestors—themselves	  highly	  contested	  within	  the	  legislature—are	  
seemingly	  ignored	  by	  political	  parties	  in	  the	  drafting	  of	  national	  lists.	  	  
	   In	  short,	  it	  does	  appear	  that	  the	  European	  Parliament’s	  transnational	  party	  
groups	  are	  able	  to	  protect	  their	  house	  from	  potential	  agency	  loss	  to	  the	  national	  parties	  
at	  election	  time,	  but	  only	  to	  a	  degree.	  From	  a	  normative	  perspective,	  this	  suggests	  that	  
MEPs	  with	  an	  interest	  in	  retaining	  their	  position	  may	  need	  to	  refocus	  their	  attention	  on	  
just	  how	  they	  are	  behaving	  while	  on	  the	  job.	  Meanwhile,	  transnational	  party	  groups	  
must	  remain	  cognizant	  that	  the	  most	  seemingly	  important	  positions	  for	  their	  purposes	  
may	  not	  be	  the	  same	  for	  others.	  The	  party	  groups	  may	  therefore	  need	  to	  shift	  their	  
office-­‐seeking	  ambitions	  somewhat,	  in	  order	  to	  guarantee	  their	  policy-­‐seeking	  needs.	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Table	  2.	  Parametric	  Ordered	  Probit	  with	  Sample	  Selection	  for	  MEP	  List	  Rank	  
1.	  Ordered	  Probit	  Model	   Coeficient	   R.S.E.	   z-­‐score	   p-­‐value	  
DV:	  MEP	  List	  Rank	  (N=508)	  
	   	   	   	  Terms	  Served	   0.147	   0.039	   3.80	   0.000	  
Female	   0.019	   0.087	   0.22	   0.827	  
EP	  Leader	   0.196	   0.173	   1.13	   0.257	  
Committee	  Leader	   0.260	   0.131	   1.98	   0.047	  
Rapporteurships	   -­‐0.010	   0.007	   -­‐1.54	   0.125	  
Education	   0.076	   0.034	   2.25	   0.024	  
EPP	   -­‐0.299	   0.114	   -­‐2.62	   0.009	  
S&D	   -­‐0.351	   0.115	   -­‐3.05	   0.002	  
ECR	   0.182	   0.188	   0.97	   0.332	  
ALDE	   0.033	   0.159	   0.21	   0.834	  
National	  Party	  in	  Gov't	   -­‐0.220	   0.094	   -­‐2.34	   0.019	  
2.	  Probit	  Selection	  Model	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
DV:	  Seek	  Reelection	  (N=848)	  
	   	   	   	  Terms	  Served	   -­‐0.199	   0.045	   -­‐4.42	   0.000	  
Dropout	  	   -­‐1.287	   0.158	   -­‐8.15	   0.000	  
Age	   -­‐0.004	   0.004	   -­‐1.19	   0.233	  
Female	   -­‐0.090	   0.090	   -­‐1.00	   0.318	  
National	  Party	  in	  Gov't	   0.123	   0.088	   1.41	   0.160	  
EP	  Leader	   0.080	   0.158	   0.50	   0.615	  
Committee	  Leader	   -­‐0.111	   0.129	   -­‐0.86	   0.390	  
Rapporteurships	   0.015	   0.011	   1.31	   0.190	  
Capital	  Distance	   -­‐0.001	   0.000	   -­‐6.24	   0.000	  
Local	  Elections	   -­‐0.058	   0.052	   -­‐1.13	   0.259	  
Constant	   1.287	   0.237	   5.42	   0.000	  
Ordered	  Probit	  Thresholds:	  
	   	   	   	  Cut	  1	   -­‐0.992	   0.166	   -­‐5.99	   0.000	  
Cut	  2	   -­‐0.060	   0.156	   -­‐0.39	   0.699	  
ρ	   -­‐1.000	   0.000	   -­‐1.00	   1.000	  
χ²	  (Wald	  Test)	   0.03	   	  	   	  	   0.865	  
Note:	  Significant	  probit	  coefficient	  statistics	  shaded	  for	  clarity	  
	  	  
